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Abstract: Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics has been
criticized as incoherent and opportunistic, and based on doubtful
philosophical premises. If so Bohr’s influence, in the pre-war period
of 1927-1939, is the harder to explain, and the acceptance of his
approach to quantum mechanics over de Broglie’s had no reasonable
foundation. But Bohr’s interpretation changed little from the time
of its first appearance, and stood independent of any philosophical
presuppositions. The principle of complementarity is itself best read
as a conjecture of unusually wide scope, on the nature and future
course of explanations in the sciences (and not only the physical
sciences). If it must be judged a failure today, it is not because of
any internal inconsistency.
Despite the expenditure of much effort, I have been unable to obtain a clear
understanding of Bohr’s principle of complementarity (Einstein).
Bohr’s point - and the central point of quantum mechanics - is that no elemen-
tary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered (observed) phenom-
enon (Wheeler).
1 A QUESTION POSED
It was only in the last quarter of the twentieth century that alternatives to
quantum mechanics finally came of age: only then was it agreed, by majority (if
not quite unanimous) consent, that de Broglie’s pilot-wave theory was indeed
empirically equivalent to the non-relativistic theory; and by the late 1980s that
state reduction too might be employed at ground level in a precise and universal
formalism, empirically equivalent to the standard one.
Recognition of these facts was hard-won, and, in the case of the state-
reduction theory, built on hard labour. But it was otherwise with pilot-wave
theory. The essential ideas for this were laid down by de Broglie in the 1920s.
When Bohm independently discovered the formalism in 1952 he added only new
applications (in particular to the measurement process itself). Why was it so
neglected?
This question becomes more troubling when it is recognized that the view
that did prevail in the inter-war years, Bohr’s interpretation of quantum theory,
was flatly in contradiction to the pilot-wave approach. Embarrassment turns
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to scandal when it is added that Bohr’s view was wedded to idealism: to the
view that there is no quantum reality, that it is the observer who brings about
the result of the measurement. It must then be explained how the physics
community, to an extraordinary degree of uniformity, could have bought into
such an extreme and unnecessary philosophical position, in support of a theory
to which the pilot-wave theory was a clear counter-example.
The view that Bohr’s philosophy was so committed - if not to a Berkelerian
idealism, then to anti-realism or to neo-Kantianism - is now very prevalent
(see e.g. [23][27]). There is plenty of evidence that Bohr was drawn to neo-
Kantianism; there is no doubt that he saw complementarity as a theory of
importance to philosophy as well as physics. Given which, the view that Bohr’s
success can only be explained, if explained at all, by sociological consider-
ations, of fortuitous coincidences of philosophical movements, of institutional
and collaborative influences, becomes extremely persuasive: Bohr did stand at
the centre of most of the major discoveries leading to the matrix mechanics; he
was revered by the younger generation of physicists, including Kramers, Pauli,
and Heisenberg (and even Dirac). Cushing was the first to press the question
I am concerned with and was led to just this conclusion [16]; others have since
followed him [1].
Or something has gone wrong with our standard of rationality. One can
confront the challenge head-on. One can simply deny that it was reasonable
to buy into pilot-wave theory, at least in the inter-war years. After all it faces
serious difficulties when it comes to relativity,1 and not all is at is seems when
it comes to its account of the observable phenomena (I shall come back to
this in due course). Just as important, almost no-one at the time (not even
de Broglie) was prepared to believe that the pilot-wave - a complex-valued
function on configuration space, so a space of enormously high dimension -
could be taken as physically real. And it gets much worse when one takes on
board the implications of extending this idea to the macroscopic level, as one
must, if pilot-wave theory is to get rid of state-reduction. De Broglie was never
prepared to take this step. Although he was perfectly clear that one could drop
non-overlapping “empty” waves from the guidance equation - so providing for
an “effective” state-reduction - he could not countenance the same treatment
when it came to the measurement apparatus and the macroscopic world (not
even after reading Bohm’s papers [17][18, p.178]). The pilot-wave in that case
is nothing less than a wave-function to the universe. It was not Bohm in 1952
who was the first to explore the meaning of that concept, but Everett, in 1957.
Who says it was rational to buy into this picture of reality?2
1I have argued elsewhere that the only feasible option here is the Dirac hole theory (al-
though whether this is really credible, from a realist point of view, is another matter). Working
with field-configurations instead, as recommended by Valentini [35], is of no use in making
contact with phenomenology, and worse, if these are the beables, provides no guarantee that
objects will be localized at the macroscopic level, where they need to be [32].
2The argument that pilot-wave theory incorporates the same ontology as Everett’s has
been made by Brown and Wallace [15]. I would only add that if it is to be resisted, it is at
the price of denying the intelligibility of the state-reduction approach altogether (so this too
faces a “problem of rationality”, according to the pilot-wave theory).
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Hindsight does not always yield clear vision. Nevertheless, believable or not,
pilot-wave theory is clearly a causal, spacetime theory, of the sort that Bohr
denied was possible. There is undoubtedly a severe tension, if not outright
contradiction, between Bohr’s account of quantum mechanics and de Broglie’s.
And embarrassment at the failure to expose it still turns to scandal if, as is
alleged, Bohr’s philosophy was itself incoherent or philosophically extreme. It
is this more limited question that I am concerned with in the sequel.
2 HOW TO DEFEND COMPLEMENTARITY
There have been plenty of attempts in recent years to make sense of Bohr’s
writings as a coherent and systematic interpretation of quantum mechanics,
but no account of this sort that I know of is directed to the choices that were
made by the wider community of physicists in the ’20s and ’30s.3 That limits
the options. From that perspective, if it is to be defended at all, Bohr’s principle
of complementarity, that stands at the heart of his interpretation, has to make
sense as a principle that was plausible and accessible to his readers at the time.
It will not do to read it as based on esoteric philosophical principles; it will not do
to justify it by mathematical or physical arguments that were then unfamiliar.
The answer had better lie more on the surface of his writings.
What is wrong with complementarity as based on philosophical principles?
The answer is not only that it would then have hardly had much appeal among
physicists; it is that it would have had too broad a scope, and pilot-wave theory
refutes it. As we shall see, the principle needs to be read as anchored in the
phenomena if it is to stand any hope of escaping this objection. Only on one
point was it reasonable to commit to any a priori (or dogmatic) principle, in
the absence (at the time) of any worked out view to the contrary, and that was
the irreplaceability of classical concepts (agreed on by Bohr, Einstein and de
Broglie). The old quantum theory was of course also based on classical concepts;
Bohr was as much concerned to make sense of the old quantum theory as the
new.
Broadly philosophical presuppositions can be allowed, so long as they were
genuinely community-wide. Anti-realism and idealism are not in this category,
but a mildly operationalist outlook is.4 Bohr was concerned with experiments
and with the operational definitions of concepts, as were most of his contempo-
raries. A broad and shallow form of operationalism is perfectly compatible with
realism (“realism with a cautious face”).
Finally, since our concern is with Bohr’s influence on the wider scientific
community in the inter-war period, it is only his views and writings at this
time that matter. Three stand out as especially important. The first is his
3Howard’s [26] is a possible exception, but as he himself says, his account is a reconstruction
rather than an exegesis of Bohr’s interpretation.
4The notion of “the observer” as a central concept of special relativity was also common
ground to Bohr and his readers. Bohr often drew attention to it in his discusions of quantum
mechanics. But the parallel was not essential to Bohr’s arguments (it was the notion of a
frame of rerence that played the greater role), and I shall not consider it here.
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address to the International Congress of Physics in Como, Italy, in 1927 (the
Como lecture), published in Nature the following year as “The quantum pos-
tulate and the recent development of atomic theory” (and, in German, in Die
Naturwisssenschaften). It was the centre piece of his collection Atomtheorie und
Naturbeschreibung published in 1931, translated as Atomic Theory and Human
Knowledge in 1934 [2]. In the Como lecture Bohr first set out his theory of
complementarity, following two years of almost complete public silence (the two
years that covered the explosive discovery of the new mechanics). The second is
the preface to this collection, the “Introductory Survey” [2, pp.1-24], first pub-
lished in 1929 (in Danish) as an accompaniment to the Danish translations of
these articles. In the German and English translations this was read almost as
widely as the Como lecture itself. And the third is Bohr’s response to Einstein,
Podolski, and Rosen (the EPR argument), published in 1935 [5]; that followed
several years of debate with Einstein over foundations and in effect marked their
conclusion. Any account of Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics that is
not clearly embodied in these three texts is worthless for our purposes.
Better still is an account consistent with these and with Bohr’s own eval-
uation of his thinking in this period. That we have in his contribution to the
Schilpp volume in the Library of Living Philosophers devoted to Einstein, pub-
lished in 1949 [8]; there Bohr reappraised both the Como lecture and his dis-
cussions with Einstein. In this spirit one other article is worth special mention,
“Quantum physics and philosophy - causality and complementarity” published
in 1958 [9]. It was Bohr’s last presentation of complementarity. According to
his son and executor Aage Bohr, he felt that there he expressed some of its key
concepts more clearly and concisely than he had elsewhere. Bohr died in 1962.
My claim is that in these writings Bohr is most clearly and consistently read
as a realist, albeit of an operational persuasion; that his goal was to present a
framework in which quantum phenomena were to be analyzed in classical terms;
and that he argued for this framework in terms of principles, and specifically
the principle of complementarity, as scientific principles, broadly empirical in
scope, rather than philosophical ones, that stood independent of idealism or
neo-Kantianism (or any other school in philosophy). And in these respects I
maintain he was largely successful.
None of this is to say that it was reasonable, circa the late 1920s and ’30s,
to embrace Bohr’s views and to reject de Broglie’s and Einstein’s; but it is a
step in the right direction. I shall have a further comment to make on this at
the end.
3 THE COMO LECTURE
In 1927 Bohr’s point of departure was the quantum postulate. A principle of
that name had long been familiar to the old quantum theory, as defined by the
Bohr-Sommerfeld quantization rules (the principle that any change in action,
with the units of angular momentum, must be an integral multiple of Planck’s
constant h). Of quantum mechanics, he began:
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Its essence may be expressed in the so-called quantum postulate,
which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or
rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories and
symbolized by Planck’s constant of action. [2, p.53]
Bohr immediately went on to say that the quantum postulate “implies a renun-
ciation as regards the causal spacetime coordination of atomic processes”.
Both claims were by then contentious, given that Schro¨dinger had deduced
the quantization rule as a consequence of boundary conditions for the solutions
of a continuous wave equation only the previous year. It may be that Bohr
was convinced, with the experience of the failure of the Bohr, Kramers and
Slater theory just behind him, that if energy and momentum were conserved in
individual processes then quantum jumps were just as unavoidable in wave me-
chanics as in matrix mechanics (Schro¨dinger’s wave function and Slater’s virtual
radiation field were closely allied). Later on in the Como lecture Bohr spoke
of wave mechanics as “a symbolic transcription” that is “only to be interpreted
by an explicit use of the quantum postulate”. On two occasions he spoke of
the postulate as “irrational” (as in “...we meet...the inevitability of the feature
of irrationality characterizing the quantum postulate”). This makes the aban-
donment of causal spacetime descriptions look like an assumption from the very
beginning.
But the argument that followed was more circumspect. There was a special
sense in which the causal, spacetime idea of explanation was to be weakened.
Here is the argument on its first appearance:
Now, the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic
phenomena will involve an interaction with the agency of observa-
tion not to be neglected. Accordingly, an independent reality in the
ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena
nor to the agencies of observation.
Bohr argues from the quantum postulate, understood as implying an inelim-
inable interaction on observation, to a “no-separation” principle - that the object
of observation is inseparably bound up with the experimental context. Similar
claims may be found in all his subsequent writings on quantum mechanics.
Bohr continued:
After all, the concept of observation is in so far arbitrary as it de-
pends upon which objects are included in the subsystem to be ob-
served. Ultimately, every observation can, of course, be reduced
to our sense perceptions. The circumstance, however, that in inter-
preting observations use has always to be made of theoretical notions
entails that for every particular case it is a question of convenience
at which point the concept of observation involving the quantum
postulate with its inherent ”irrationality” is brought in.
Bohr here and subsequently is certainly preoccupied with “observation”, with
experiments - on what can be said of the microscopic realm on the basis of
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experiments. To this extent his philosophy was broadly operationalist. On the
other hand his position is far from positivist, in Mach’s sense: Bohr is clear
that observations, whether or not they are reducible to sense impressions (as it
happens he grants that they are), must be expressed in terms of concepts - they
are interpreted - and in this precisely where one puts the boundary between
the observed system and the context of the observation is somewhat arbitrary.
Bohr repeatedly spoke of “measurement” (“agencies of measurement”) in the
sequel: the boundary at issue for Bohr as much marks the distinction between
the context of the experiment and the object under investigation, as between
“the observer” and “the observed”. In his later writings it was the former that
was increasingly to the fore.5
He immediately continues:
This situation has far-reaching consequences. On one hand, the
definition of the state of a physical system, as ordinarily understood,
claims the elimination of all external disturbances. But in that case,
according to the quantum postulate, any observation will be im-
possible, and, above all, the concepts of space and time lose their
immediate sense. On the other hand, if in order to make observa-
tion possible we permit certain interactions with suitable agencies
of measurement, not belonging to the system, an unambiguous de-
finition of the state of the system is no longer possible, and there
can be no question of causality in the ordinary sense of the word.
The very nature of the quantum theory thus forces us to regard
the space-time co-ordination and the claim of causality, the union
of which characterizes the classical theories, as complementary but
exclusive features of the description, symbolizing the idealization of
observation and definition respectively. [2, p.54, emphasis original]
This is the first time that the word “complementary” was used by Bohr.
The simplest reading of this passage is more strongly operationalist: the
concepts of space and time have no meaning independent of a context of obser-
vation. As a philosophical doctrine it will therefore apply equally to classical
physics. The difference, for microscopic quantum phenomena, is that the act of
observation cannot under any circumstances be neglected. Because of the quan-
tum postulate, there is an irreducible coupling between apparatus and measured
system, that cannot be made arbitrarily small.6 A microscopic system to which
spacetime coordinates can be assigned can therefore never be considered a closed
system, not even as an idealization. So equations of motion in the customary
5For a typical example: “We must recognize that a measurement can mean nothing else
than the unambiguous comparison of some property of the object under investigation with a
corresponding property of another system, serving as a measuring instrument, and for which
this property is directly determinable according to its definition in everyday language or in
the terminology of classical physics.”[7, p.19]
6Understood as a statement about energy or momentum transfers, this point is not en-
tirely general. What is entirely general is that, for a given basis, the presence or absence of
entanglement can never be neglected. Much hangs on this distinction.
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form are not available; what equations may be found for it will not conserve
energy and momentum; no “causal” description is possible. In this sense space-
time coordination and causality cannot be combined. Further, at least in a
number of important examples, the reciprocal nature of this limitation can be
quantified by means of the uncertainty relations.
This reading is consistent with the rest of the Como lecture. There and in
his later writings Bohr repeatedly gave examples to show that the attempt to
give an operational meaning to the spatiotemporal coordinates of a phenomenon
leads to an uncontrollable flow of momentum and energy into and out of the
system, of just such an amount as to satisfy the uncertainty relations. As of
the Como lecture the foundation of the latter was the de Broglie relations:
in them the “fundamental contrast between the quantum of action and the
classical concepts is immediately apparent”. Momentum and energy (the basis
of a “causal” description) is thereby related to wavelength and frequency; with
that the uncertainty relations (or near neighbours of them) follow immediately:
At the same time, the possibility of identifying the velocity of the
particle with the group-velocity indicates the field of application of
space-time pictures in the quantum theory. Here the complementary
character of the description appears, since the use of wave-groups
is necessarily accompanied by a lack of sharpness in the definition
of period and wave-length, and hence also in the definition of the
corresponding energy and momentum as given by [the de Broglie
relations]. [2, p.59]
Bohr’s derivation of the uncertainty relations depended only on the de Broglie
relations and the concepts of elementary (linear) wave theory.
This point is worth emphasizing, for whilst Bohr, as of the time of the
Como lecture, had finally taken on board what he had always regarded as the
most profound paradox of the quantum theory - the wave-particle duality - he
had yet to absorb even quite superficial features of the new mechanics. As he
apologetically prefaced his address:
[A]mong the audience there will be several who, due to their partic-
ipation in the remarkable recent development, will surely be more
conversant with details of the highly developed formalism than I
am. Still, I shall try, by making use only of simple considerations
and without going into any details of the technical mathematical
character, to describe to you a certain general point of view which
I believe is suited to give an impression of the general trend of the
development of the theory from its very beginning and which I hope
will be helpful in order to harmonize the apparently conflicting views
taken by different scientists. [2, p.52, emphasis mine]
It is most unlikely that Bohr meant by the “very beginning” the beginning of
the new quantum mechanics (no more than two years old). Evidently, he was
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as much concerned, in the Como lecture, with the trend of development of the
old quantum theory, as with the new.
Our reading of Bohr to this point is relatively uncontroversial, but the initial
steps of Bohr’s argument remain obscure. What, precisely, is the “quantum pos-
tulate”, and why does it lead to what I am calling the “no-separation” principle
- the doctrine that neither the agency of observation nor the object observed
can be ascribed “independent reality in the ordinary physical sense”? Bohr
presented this conclusion as an immediate consequence of the impossibility of
neglecting the measurement interaction, but it is not clear if this is a reference to
the “individuality” of an atomic process - whatever, precisely, that may mean -
or its “essential discontinuity”. But either way, Bohr is evidently taking it as an
“external disturbance” to a system (for only then does it imply that on measure-
ment a system cannot be free of any external disturbance). It is tempting to go
on to take Bohr to mean “disturbance” in its normal sense, as a causal physical
process. With that one is led very quickly to simple-minded disturbance the-
ory of measurement. The observed system is disturbed by its interaction with
the measuring apparatus, so it can no longer be treated as isolated (and the
energy-momentum conservation laws will no longer hold for it, so “causality” is
violated).
The disturbance theory of measurement had the virtues of simplicity and
clarity, and it was certainly popular; it figured in many of the early texts in
quantum mechanics; but it falls foul to obvious objections. Why not seek to cor-
rect for the disturbance, as one does classically, in cases where the measurement
interaction is not in fact negligible? (obviating the no-separation principle).
Why not, to this end, include the measuring apparatus in with the measured
system, and model the interaction between the two directly, in quantum me-
chanical terms? We know of course of one answer to this question: that if we
apply the unitary equations of motion to the apparatus as well as to the system
measured, we are led to a description of no one definite outcome at all - appar-
ently, to nonsense. But Bohr did not begin with the abstract formalism; he did
not acknowledge the problem of measurement as such. His point was not: here
is the problem of measurement, to solve it we have to insist on X. Bohr’s point
is: here is the quantum postulate and some philosophical or physical principles;
deduce X (and from X, one might hope, solve or dissolve the problem of mea-
surement). So what, according to Bohr, is wrong with applying the ordinary
equations (suitable for a closed system) to the apparatus and observed system
taken together? Bohr can continue to insist that that description, if cast in
terms of space and time coordinates, must itself be observed by some agency
(to give “sense” to the coordinations), but why an outside agency? Cannot the
universe be observed from within? Is he bound by some neo-Kantian injunction
or what-not against global descriptions?
On this reading Bohr is on awkward ground. His thesis is in danger of
becoming overtly philosophical, and hostage to philosophical arguments that
may take unforeseen directions. It is hardly what he intends. He is trying to do
justice “to the general trend of the development of the theory” (including the
old quantum theory) as recognized by physicists, not in accordance with arcane
8
metaphysical principles. To insist on clear operational meanings to physical
concepts is one thing; on Kantian bounds of sense is quite another.
All of this flows from the simple-minded picture of the experiment as in-
troducing a disturbance in the object measured. If this were the whole story,
Bohr, on review of Heisenberg’s operational analysis of the uncertainty relations
in terms of a disturbance on measurement, would not have continued as he did:
The essence of this consideration is the inevitability of the quan-
tum postulate in the estimation of the possibilities of measurement.
A closer investigation of the possibilities of definition would still
seem necessary in order to bring out the general complementary
character of the description. Indeed, a discontinuous change of en-
ergy and momentum during observation could not prevent us from
ascribing accurate values to the space-time coordinates, as well as
to the momentum-energy components before and after the process.
The reciprocal uncertainty which always affects the values of these
quantities is, as will be clear from the proceeding analysis, essen-
tially an outcome of the limited accuracy with which changes in
energy and momentum can be defined, when the wave-fields used for
the determination of the space-time coordinates of the particle are
sufficiently small. [2, p.63, emphasis mine]
Bohr went on to speak of “the complementarity of the possibilities of definition”,
emphasizing that “the agreement between the possibilities of observation and
those of definition can be directly shown” (emphasis mine); that sets clear limits
to any positivist elements in Bohr’s operationalism. But the most decisive reason
to reject the assimilation of complementarity as of this point to a disturbance
theory of measurement is given, not by Bohr, but by Heisenberg, in a note added
in proof to his paper on the uncertainty relations:
Bohr has brought to my attention that I have overlooked essential
points in the course of several discussions in this paper. Above all,
the uncertainty in our observation does not arise exclusively from the
occurrence of discontinuities, but is tied directly to the demand that
we ascribe equal validity to the quite different experiments which
show up in the corpuscular theory on one hand, and in the wave
theory on the other. [25, p.198]
That is precisely how Bohr went on to illustrate complementarity at the begin-
ning of the Como lecture, first in terms of the wave-particle duality for light,
and then for matter:
Just as in the case of light, we have consequently in the question
of the nature of matter, so far as we adhere to classical concepts,
to face an inevitable dilemma which has to be regarded as the very
expression of experimental evidence. In fact, here again we are not
dealing with contradictory but with complementary pictures of the
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phenomena, which only together offer a natural generalization of the
classical mode of description. [2, p.56]
Complementarity, on its first appearance, was thus a thesis concerning the
contextuality of the phenomenon to the experiment, as expressed by classical
concepts, under a reciprocal latitude in definition as follows from the de Broglie
relations; and of the agreement between this and a corresponding reciprocity in
their simultaneous measurability. He never changed his views on these matters.
But not all of Bohr’s assumptions were properly in evidence in the Como
lecture. Bohr spoke of adhering to the classical concepts - but why should we?
The challenge was made shortly after by Schro¨dinger in correspondence: that
interesting as the limitations of the classical concepts were, as subject to the
uncertainty relations
[I]t seems to me imperative to demand the introduction of new con-
cepts, in which this limitation no longer occurs. Since what is un-
observable in principle should not at all be contained in our concep-
tual scheme, it should not be representable in terms of the latter.
In the adequate conceptual scheme it ought no more to seem that
our possibilities of experience are restricted through unfavourable
circumstances [11, p.465]
Bohr could not have been more cool in his reply:
I am scarcely in complete agreement with your stress on the necessity
of developing “new” concepts. Not only, as far as I can see, have
we up to now no clues for such a re-arrangement, but the “old”
experiential concepts seem to me to be inseparably connected with
the foundation of man’s power of visualising [11, p.465]
He is on shaky ground, however. It was not so long before that Euclidean
geometry was supposed to be the only visualizable geometry, the existence of
mathematical schemes for non-Euclidean geometries notwithstanding. Bohr’s
position, at this point, is dogmatic.
If a point of dogma, better state it at the beginning of any argument for com-
plementarity, and better free it from any reliance on dubious empirical claims
about our “powers of visualization”. It came in the very first paragraph of the
“Introductory Survey” to his Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature,
written in 1929:
Only by experience itself do we come to recognize those laws which
grant us a comprehensive view of the diversity of phenomena. As
our knowledge becomes wider, we must always be prepared, there-
fore, to expect alterations in the points of view best suited for the
ordering of our experience. In this connection we must remember,
above all, that, as a matter of course, all new experience makes its
appearance within the frame of our customary points of view and
forms of perception. [2, p.1]
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Later on in the same survey the point was made again, this time with reference
to “our customary ideas or their direct verbal expressions”. This commitment
to classical concepts on the basis of their role in ordinary language figured
repeatedly in Bohr’s subsequent writings. It was, for Bohr, the rational for a
far more sweeping commitment. He immediately continued:
No more is it likely that the fundamental concepts of the classical
theories will ever become superfluous for the description of physical
experience. The recognition of the indivisibility of the quantum of
action, and the determination of its magnitude, not only depend
on an analysis of measurements based on classical concepts, but it
continues to be the application of these concepts alone that makes it
possible to relate the symbolism of the quantum theory to the data
of experience. [2, p.16]
The jump from the necessity and unrevisability of the concepts of everyday
experience to that of the fundamental concepts of classical theories was unsub-
stantiated, however.7 But almost no-one apart from Schro¨dinger saw this as
a weakness of Bohr’s interpretation; and certainly not Einstein, his principal
critic.
4 BOHR’S RESPONSE TO THE EPR ARGU-
MENT
The early 1930s were the must crucial years for the interpretation of quantum
mechanics. They followed much publicized and visible encounters between Ein-
stein and Bohr on the subject of foundations (in particular at the 6th Solvay
Conference of 1930). With the appearance of the first comprehensive introduc-
tions to the subject, by Pauli, Kramers, Jordan and Dirac, and with time to
assimilate the new formalism, a deeper appreciation of its paradoxes was in the
air. Things came to a head in 1935: in that year a number of criticisms of
7One might wonder if, far from exhausting the concepts available in the description of
our experience, the use of classical concepts is even so much as consistent with quantum
mechanics. This question, of whether classical concepts, taken individually, could so much as
be employed in the quantum domain, had guided Heisenberg in his discovery of the uncertainty
relations; his conclusion was that they could (and that only their simultaneous deployment
was circumscribed) so Bohr’s piecemeal use of them did at least have Heisenberg’s sanction.
In Heisenberg’s words: “All concepts which can be used in classical theory for the description
of a mechanical system can also be defined exactly for atomic processes in analogy to the
classical concepts.” [25, p.68, emphasis original]. (In point of fact, the claim at this level
of generality runs very quickly into trouble. Shortly after, Jordan and Dirac both noted
the difficulties of giving any meaning to the time or phase as self-adjoint operators obeying
canonical commutation relations with the energy, if the latter is to have a point spectrum.
Mathematically, the difficulty is that no quantization procedure has been found in which the
full symmetry group of classical phase space, the symplectic group, can be implemented as a
group of unitary transformations on a Hilbert space.)
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the new mechanics were published, by von Laue, Schro¨dinger, and (with Podol-
ski and Rosen) Einstein. It was Einstein’s parting shot: he left Germany for
America in 1933, never to return.
The view is very widely held that Bohr, without admitting it, shifted his
position markedly in the face of these developments, and above all the EPR ar-
gument. That would be a damaging admission, if true; for not only would Bohr
stand revealed as an opportunist, it would show that the community embraced
quite distinct orthodoxies without even realizing it. Fortunately, however, whilst
there undoubtedly were shifts in Bohr’s position, they effected his argumentative
strategy more than its substance. On substance the changes were subtle.
This claim needs to be justified. Bohr frequently remarked on the value he
placed on his discussions with Einstein, almost all of which took place before
Einstein’s departure for America. Here is a lesson he said he learned early from
them:
The extent to which renunciation of the visualization of atomic phe-
nomena is imposed upon us by the impossibility of their subdivision
is strikingly illustrated by the following example to which Einstein
very early called attention and often has reverted. If a semi-reflecting
mirror is placed in the way of a photon, having two possibilities for
its direction of propagation, the photon may either be recorded on
one, and only one, of two photographic plates situated at great dis-
tances in the two directions in question, or else we may, by replacing
the plates by mirrors, observe effects exhibiting an interference be-
tween the two reflected wave-trains. In any attempt of a pictorial
representation of the behaviour of the photon we would, thus, meet
with the difficulty: to be obliged to say, on the one hand, that the
photon always chooses one of the two ways and, on the other hand,
that it behaves as if it had passed both ways. [8, p.221]
It is an early example of a delayed-choice experiment. One must change the
description of a system in the past, needed to explain a measurement, depending
on which of two measurements one chooses to make later on.
In one respect this is worse than any non-locality in space, as was shortly
to be demonstrated by the EPR argument [22]: it is an action of the present
on the past.8 It is a case in which the phenomenon is contextualized to the
experimental conditions; it illustrates Bohr’s “no-separation” principle. Bohr
had, moreover, already met with attempts by Einstein to extend this to non-
locality in a predictive sense (I shall come back to these in a moment). If
the paper of Einstein et al really came as an “onslaught...as a bolt from the
blue”, as Rosenfeld later said [29, p.142], the ideas were by no means entirely
unfamiliar to Bohr (which does not of course mean that he had anticipated
8However it was widely accepted that retrodictions have a rather different status from
predictions in quantum mechanics, in view of the fact that - say from successive measurements
of position of arbitrary accuracy - one can defeat the uncertainty relations. According to Bohr
in the Como lecture, in such cases we deal with an “abstraction, from which no unambiguous
information can be obtained”.
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the argument). Nor did it take him long to respond to it, by his standards -
little over a month - in a short note in Nature [4]; this, almost verbatim, was
the core of the much longer reply he published in the Physical Review near the
end of the year [5]. In the latter he began with well-known experiments that
he had already used as examples of complementarity. According to Bohr, the
EPR argument “does not actually involve any greater intricacies than the simple
examples discussed above”. If Bohr saw anything new in the EPR argument, he
did not acknowledge it. Yet for Einstein it was conclusive proof that quantum
mechanics was incomplete, a view that he held to the end of his life.
The EPR argument, recall, rested on a sufficiency condition for a quantity
to be counted an “element of reality”. The condition was that the quantity
can be predicted with certainty “without in any way disturbing the system”.
Depending on which of two experiments was performed on one system, and on
the outcome obtained, the value of one or other of two non-commuting quantities
associated with a second system could be predicted with certainty. Since this is
so even in the absence of any interaction between the two systems, the sufficiency
condition is satisfied; so both must be elements of reality. But they could not
both be represented as such by any single quantum state: quantum mechanical
description is therefore incomplete.
The argument turns on the key concepts of “disturbance” and “interaction”
in the very context - what Einstein et al called “reduction of the wave packet”
- that was so critical to Bohr’s interpretation (bringing in “the quantum pos-
tulate”). Naturally, therefore, according to Bohr of the Como lecture, it is a
context in which “an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can
neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation.” To
complete the line of thought he expressed then, this is because the quantum
postulate implies that there is an interaction between agency of observation
and object (one that is not to be neglected). What is needed, then, if Bohr is to
be consistent with his creed, is to bite the bullet and admit there is still some
kind of an interaction even if it is not of the usual sort (and, he might have
added, even if it acts at a distance9). That is just what he said:
Of course there is in a case like that just considered no question of
a mechanical disturbance or the system under investigation during
the last critical phase of the measuring procedure. But even at this
stage there is essentially the question of an influence on the very
conditions which define the possible types of predictions regarding
the future behaviour of the system. Since these conditions consti-
tute an inherent element of the description of any phenomenon to
which the term “physical reality” can be properly attached, we see
that the argumentation of the mentioned authors does not justify
9There were special difficulties in treating the EPR state dynamically (in contrast to
Bohm’s later version in terms of corelated spins). Neither in the EPR paper nor in Bohr’s
reply was any mention made of locality. But the potential non-local character of the influ-
ence Bohr spoke of must have been obvious, given Einstein’s previous criticisms of quantum
mechanics.
13
their conclusion that quantum-mechanical description is essentially
incomplete. [5, p.700, emphasis original]
(In his earlier one-page reply, Bohr used the phrase “...no question of a direct
mechanical interaction....”.)
It is a wordier version of Bohr’s no-separation principle, but now quite clearly
divorced from the disturbance picture of measurement. It is the principle that
any physically real phenomenon must be specified under definite experimental
conditions, so any change in the latter must lead to a change in the former,
even if no ordinary interaction is involved. To put it in spacetime terms (which
neither Bohr nor Einstein et al had, given that the EPR state was defined
at only a single instant of time), it is not as though one can hold a part of
the phenomenon, the remote part, constant, whilst varying the experimental
conditions of the local part of the phenomenon - this would be to try to visualize
the phenomenon in accordance with causal spacetime concepts; it would be to
ignore the “individual” nature of a quantum phenomenon.
At this point the strain of not interpreting Bohr’s non-mechanical interac-
tion as entanglement, and the quantum postulate as state-reduction, becomes
well-nigh intolerable, but still it should be resisted. It is not only that he never
accepted these identifications, it was that for Bohr, formal concepts like entan-
glement and state reduction could never have been explanatory (the formalism
was only an abstract calculus). To put the quantum postulate in terms of state
reduction is to look at Bohr’s theory from the wrong direction.
If we stay with Bohr’s own terms, there is not a great deal to add in reply to
Einstein et al - unless it is to illustrate how Bohr’s no-separation principle had
functioned all along, in the familiar cases he had already analyzed in his Como
lecture. That is precisely what the bulk of his reply in the Physical Review
contained. But in the course of it he did refine his position in certain respects,
and he took the opportunity, naturally enough, to put the matter more as he
had done in his Introductory Survey of 1929:
While, however, in classical physics the distinction between object
and measuring agencies does not entail any difference in the charac-
ter of the description of the phenomena concerned, its fundamental
importance in quantum theory, as we have seen, has its root in the
indispensable use of classical concepts in the interpretation of all
proper measurements, even though the classical theories do not suf-
fice in accounting for the new types of regularities with which we are
concerned in atomic physics. In accordance with this situation there
can be no question of any unambiguous interpretation of the symbols
of quantum mechanics other than that embodied in the well-known
rules which allow us to predict the results to be obtained by a given
experimental arrangement described in a totally classical way. [5,
p.701]
Here Bohr is crystal-clear. His interpretation is of the phenomena in terms of
classical concepts, even though no classical theory can account for such regular-
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ities. This was the heart of what was really innovative about Bohr’s principle
of complementarity: how could one describe regularities classically, when they
could not be described by any classical theory?
Before coming to that, we should take note of what is genuinely new in
Bohr’s statement over and above that in the “Introductory Survey”: it is his
insistence that the experimental arrangement be described in a totally classical
way, meaning there was no reciprocal latitude needed in any of the classical
concepts involved (the uncertainty relations do not apply).10 Use of constraints
on the possible “latitudes of definition” characterizes rather the “quantum me-
chanical description”. Thus if, in an experiment to measure the position of a
particle (using a rigidly mounted diaphragm), one wishes instead to control for
the momentum of the diaphragm, then it must, “as regards its position relative
to the rest of the apparatus, be treated, like the particle traversing the slit, as an
object of investigation, in the sense that the quantum mechanical uncertainty
relations regarding its position and momentum must be taken explicitly into
account.” ([5, p.698]).
One can read the shift as reflecting the need for the von Neumann “cut”,
but again this is to put it in terms quite foreign to Bohr. It is rather a matter of
recognizing that eventually one must make use of an apparatus whose reaction
to the process of measurement cannot itself be controlled. There must always
come a point where it is impossible to keep track of any energy and momentum
flows between the apparatus and the object that is measured (as the change in
momentum of the apparatus, let alone the change in position - relative to what?
- become totally inaccessible). One way of making the point is by insisting
that the uncertainty relations are not to be applied to the apparatus.11 Along
the way, insofar as Bohr has to draw a definite classical-quantum distinction, it
is a convenient tidying-up exercise: why not draw it at the same place as the
apparatus-object distinction?12
But it is not really needed. We can replace it, as an expression of our prag-
matic situation, by the stipulation that the conditions of an experiment must
ultimately involve rigid connections to bodies of arbitrarily large mass. In that
case the uncertainty relations, for the latter bodies, become irrelevant.13 Bohr
admitted as much when he remarked that the freedom of choice in the divide
between quantum and classical was restricted to “a region where the quantum
mechanical description of the process concerned is effectively equivalent with
the classical description” [5, p.701], and later, when he said that the require-
ments of unambiguous description of the apparatus “is secured by the use, as
measuring instruments, or rigid bodies sufficiently heavy to allow a completely
classical account of their relative positions and velocities” [9, p.3].
10In the Como lecture Bohr did suggest on at least one clear occasion that the agency of
measurement could partake of quantum mechanical uncertainties ([2, p.66]).
11See Dio´si [21], for a technical treatment along these lines.
12Howard calls this the “coincidence interpretation”, and goes on to question it, suggesting,
even, that subatomic particles might have been counted by Bohr as measuring instruments,
so long as they are assigned the right spectrum of classical properties [26]. (My disagreement
with him should be clear from the sequel.)
13But see Dickson [20], for a rather different view of the matter.
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Another tidying-up operation came shortly after his reply to EPR, and was
more explicitly terminological. Recognizing, as Bohr may not have appreciated
before the EPR argument, that the contextualizing of the phenomenon embod-
ied in the no-separation principle had to be freed much more explicitly from any
causal concepts, it would be handy to devise a terminology in terms of which the
choice of experimental arrangement strictly does not disturb the phenomenon.
But that is quite easy to do. As he later reported his proposal, made at Warsaw
in 1938:
I warned especially against phrases, often found in the physics lit-
erature, such as “disturbing of phenomena by observation”, or “cre-
ating physical attributes to atomic objects by measurement”. Such
phrases, which may serve to remind us of the apparent paradoxes in
quantum theory, are at the same time apt to cause confusion, since
words like “phenomena” and “observations”, just as “attributes” and
“measurements”, are used in a way hardly compatible with common
language and practical definition.
As a more appropriate way of expression I advocated the applica-
tion of the word phenomenon exclusively to refer to the observations
obtained under specified circumstances, including an account of the
whole experimental arrangement. [8, p.237-38, emphasis original]
With that talk of any disturbing of the phenomenon by a change in experimental
context becomes literally false, in fact a logical contradiction. If the kind of
experiment is changed we have a completely different phenomenon.
Does it follow that there is no longer a role for the idea that quantum mea-
surements disturb the system measured? Not in the least: it is essential, to
get the whole doctrine of complementarity off the ground, that there are indeed
mutually exclusive experimental arrangements. We are not talking of logical
incompatibility; the point is not that if one performs a two-slit experiment one
cannot at the same time perform a diffraction-grating experiment (a contradic-
tion in terms, even though the observables that are measured commute); the
incompatibility rather derives from a physical principle that implies an exper-
iment to measure one classical quantity thereby excludes the possibility of si-
multaneously measuring another. Here the notion of an irreducible disturbance
works perfectly well as limited to a purely local action.14 As Bohr went on to
explain, in defending the completeness of the quantum mechanical description:
On the contrary this description,15 as appears from the preceding
discussion, may be characterized as a rational utilization of all possi-
bilities of unambiguous interpretation of measurements, compatible
with the finite and uncontrollable interaction between the objects
and the measurements in the field of quantum theory. [5, p.700]
14In fact, by microcausality, this is guaranteed.
15Here, for once, we should take Bohr as talking about the quantum state (the EPR state),
understanding its decomposition with respect to the position basis or the momentum basis as
illustrating the complementary descriptions that can be given of the system.
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There would be no difficulty in measuring the position of a shutter as well as its
momentum, so performing an inclusive measurement, were it not for this local
notion of an uncontrollable disturbance on measurement. Quite distinct from
this is the no-separation principle, the non-local sense in which a phenomenon
is defined relative to one or another of such mutually exclusive experiments.
All this being so, why did Bohr have any difficulty with the EPR paper?
Rosenfeld reported that it was not all plain sailing, or not for the first few days
anyway [29]. The argument surely required a different answer to the one Bohr
had presumably found to Einstein’s earlier attempt to draw out the non-local
import of quantum mechanics, as also reported by Rosenfeld16; or the answer he
had found to Einstein’s “photon box” thought experiment, another precursor to
the EPR argument, at the 6th Solvay conference. And the mathematical exam-
ple given in the EPR paper, making use of Dirac delta-function normalization
and Fourier transforms of two-particle wave functions, was hardly physically
transparent. It made no reference to dynamics, and it was not interpreted in
terms of any actual or possible experiment. Bohr undoubtedly had to struggle
to find an experimental model for it.
There is one last and crucial component to Bohr’s reasoning. I have men-
tioned a puzzle, following his insistence on the use only of classical concepts in
interpreting experiments. How after all does he get beyond classical theory?
How to express what cannot be expressed classically? For Bohr, the quantum
formalism itself has entirely disappeared from view.17 In what sense, then, was
there any possibility of genuinely non-classical laws? The answer, in a word, is
complementarity. Bohr immediately continued:
In fact, it is only the mutual exclusion of any two experimental pro-
cedures, permitting the unambiguous definition of complimentary
physical quantities, which provides room for new physical laws, the
coexistence of which might at first sight appear irreconcilable with
the basic descriptions of science. It is just this entirely new situation
as regards the description of physical phenomena that the notion of
complementarity aims at characterizing. [5, p.700, emphasis origi-
nal]
Bohr was scarcely under pressure to explain how this was to be done (how to
make use of this “new room”); he had showed it by example in the Como lecture
and in the discussion just concluded in reply to the EPR argument. It is the
idea that this amounted to a general new method in the sciences that is the
crucial one.
16According to Rosenfeld [28], Einstein posed an outline of the EPR argument in Bruxelles
in 1933, apparently only to “illustrate the unfamiliar features of quantum phenomena”. (In
fact the outline is of a rather different, and fallacious argument, similar to the one that Dickson
has criticized as an - unattrubuted - misreading of the EPR argument [19].)
17Equations of quantum mechanics appeared only once in his reply to the EPR argument,
and that was in a footnote (presenting the two choices of commutators, for relative positions
or total momenta, in terms of the transformation theory).
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This idea also preceded the EPR argument. It was clear from Bohr’s address
to the Scandinavian Meeting of Natural Scientists in 1929, which first appeared
in German in 1931 and in English as “The atomic theory and the fundamen-
tal principles underlying the description of nature” in 1934 [2, pp.102-19]. In
this lecture he proposed that complementarity might apply also to “the more
profound biological problems”; there “we must expect to find that the recog-
nition of relationships of wider scope will require that the same conditions be
taken into consideration which determine the limitations of the causal mode
of description in the case of atomic phenomena”. The point was made more
starkly in an Addendum to his “Introductory Survey”, that he added in 1931:
“the strict application of those concepts which are adapted to our description of
inanimate nature might stand in a relationship of exclusion to the consideration
of the laws of the phenomena of life” [2, p.22-23, emphasis original]. He sug-
gested that the same may apply to psychological laws (or rather the opposition
of psychological and physical laws), and that the recognition of this “will enable
us to comprehend...that harmony which is experienced as free will and analyzed
in terms of causality”. In his Faraday lecture of 1930 [3], Bohr suggested that
the concepts of thermodynamics were mutually exclusive of the concepts of sta-
tistical thermodynamics, and that complementarity could be applied to that
domain as well.
Complementarity, it was clear by the end of the 1920s, was for Bohr a novel
explanatory framework, more general than the traditional one of causal space-
time descriptions, that applied in principle to any empirical domain in which
concepts could only be applied under mutually exclusive experimental condi-
tions, providing room for the discovery and definition of entirely new laws,
despite their restriction to those self-same concepts.
5 BOHR’S LATER PHILOSOPHY
Bohr gave a lengthy commentary on the Como lecture and the subsequent his-
tory of his discussions with Einstein in 1949, in his contribution to the Schilpp
volume of the Library of Living Philosophers devoted to Einstein. It is con-
sidered by many as the most authoritative of Bohr’s writings on quantum me-
chanics. In the argument for complementarity two assumptions were now high-
lighted. For the first (the “necessity of classical concepts”):
However far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical
explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical
terms. The argument is simply that by the word “experiment” we
refer to a situation where we can tell others what we have done
and what we have learned and that, therefore, the account of the
experimental arrangement and of the results of the observations must
be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable application of
the terminology of classical physics.[8, p.208, emphasis original]
For the second (the “no-separation principle”):
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The impossibility of any sharp separation between the behaviour of
atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments
which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena
appear [8, p.209, emphasis original]
The argument for complementarity now depends on the “individuality” of quan-
tum effects (but Bohr had used just this term in his statement of the quantum
postulate in the Como lecture):
In fact, the individuality of the typical quantum effects finds its
proper expression in the circumstance that any attempt of subdi-
viding the phenomena will demand a change in the experimental
arrangement introducing new possibilities of interaction between ob-
jects and measuring instruments which in principle cannot be con-
trolled. Consequently, evidence obtained under different experimen-
tal conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but
must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the total-
ity of the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the
objects. [8, p.209]
Bohr shortly after continued, driving home the possibility of novelty despite the
restriction to classical concepts:
While the combination of these concepts into a single picture of a
causal chain of events is the essence of classical mechanics, room for
regularities beyond the grasp of such a description is just afforded by
the circumstance that the study of the complementary phenomena
demands mutually exclusive experimental arrangements. [8, p.210]
The first and second assumptions were both stated explicitly (and the second
also italicized) in the “Introductory Survey” of 1929; the stated argument for
complementarity can be found in marginally different forms in every one of the
publications we have considered; the argument for the possibility of novelty was
clearly stated in 1929, and again in 1930 and 1931. These principles and these
arguments were the central ones in his reply to the EPR argument. Commenting
on the latter, Bohr again declared “we are here dealing with problems of just
the same kind as those raised by Einstein in previous discussions” [8, p.231]
The charge that Bohr’s views underwent a radical change as a consequence of
the EPR argument, and in particular that the holism of object-apparatus were
later developments of Bohr’s though (e.g. [16, p.32-33][23, p.185]), cannot be
sustained. But that is not to say that his theory did not have other failings. It
made no direct reference to the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics,
so there is plenty of ambiguity in how to set it out as a formal interpretation.18
Classical descriptions, within definite latitudes - as given by his quasi-classical
18It left open, in particular, the possibility that complementarity applied equally to any pair
of canonically conjugate variables (and that energy and momentum vs spacetime coordination
is only one example among many).
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formulation of the uncertainty relations - replaced quantum ones, in a procedure
of doubtful generality; and it admitted, without comment or explanation, the
non-local sense in which a phenomenon is defined by its context. Finally, the
latter continued to be subsumed under the notion of “interaction”, without
comment or qualification. This was true even in his most careful statement of
complementarity in 1958:
Far from restricting our efforts to put questions to nature in the form
of experiments, the notion of complementarity simply characterizes
the answers we can receive by such inquiry, whenever the interaction
between the measuring instruments and the objects forms an integral
part of the phenomena. [9, p.4]
In fact all Bohr’s attempts - half-hearted at best - to derive his conclusions
from independent and precisely stated hypotheses must be judged failures. Wit-
ness, in 1949, the founding principle, “the impossibility of any sharp separation
between the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring
instruments”; and again in the very same publication, in summarizing the lesson
of a variety of thought experiments, that “the main point here is the distinction
between the objects under investigation and the measuring instruments which
serve to define, in classical terms, the conditions under which the phenomena
appear.” Bohr had put the latter point even more strongly in his reply to EPR:
The necessity of discriminating in each experimental arrangement
between those parts of the physical system considered which are to
be treated as measuring instruments and those which constitute the
objects under investigation may indeed be said to form a principal
distinction between classical and quantum-mechanical description of
physical phenomena. [5, p.150]
It is not at all clear, at this point, just what the assumptions of his theory of
complementarity really are: the impossibility of making a sharp separation; the
necessity for making a sharp separation; and somewhere in this, the quantum
postulate.
In Bohr’s final paper on the subject, he first emphasized the foundation of
any kind of unambiguous physical evidence in the formation of permanent marks
Bohr did of course acknowledge that from the transformation theory and non-commutativity
quite generally it followed “that it is never possible, in the description of the state of a
mechanical system, to attach definite values to both of two canonically conjugate variables”
[5, p.696]. He also acknowledged that “in the quantum mechanical description our freedom
of constructing and handling the experimental arrangement finds its proper expression in the
possibility of choosing the classically defined paramters entering in any proper application of
the formalism” [8, p.229]. It does not follow that energy-momentum vs spacetime coordination
do not have a special significance in his theory. It was exclusively these that were at issue
in every argument and example of complementarity that he gave in the texts that we have
considered. (He made two mentions of the transformation theory in the Como lecture, in
neither case linking it to complementary; one other in his reply to EPR, already mentioned;
and none other in his later writings.)
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“such as a spot on a photographic plate caused by the impact of an electron”,
by processes of “irreversible amplification”. The necessity of a object-apparatus
divide now follows as a consequence of his earlier stipulation of 1935:
In all such points, the observation problem of quantum physics in no
way differs from the classical physical approach. The essentially new
feature in the analysis of quantum phenomena is, however, the intro-
duction of a fundamental distinction between the measuring appara-
tus and the objects under investigation. This is a direct consequence
of the necessity of accounting for the functions of the measuring in-
struments in purely classical terms, excluding in principle any regard
for the quantum of action. [9, p.3-4]
In the same essay we read that the fundamental reason why quantum indeter-
minism cannot be read as a species of classical statistical mechanics is:
In the case of quantum phenomena, the unlimited divisibility of
events implied in such an account is, in principle, excluded by the
requirement to specify the experimental conditions. Indeed, the
feature of wholeness typical of proper quantum phenomena finds
its logical expression in the circumstance that any attempt at a
well-defined subdivision would demand a change in the experimen-
tal arrangement incompatible with the definition of the phenomena
under investigation.[9, p.4]
Natural or not, there is no contradiction between these principles. The latter
insists there is no object without a context, the former that the context is
purely classical - and has to be specified as such19 to determine an unambiguous
spacetime coordination of the phenomenon. All experiments (what Bohr also
called the “proper” measurement instruments [8, p.221]) must ultimately be
described in terms of their arrangement in space and time. As Bohr added:
[T]he ascertaining of the presence of an atomic particle in a limited
space-time domain demands an experimental arrangement involving
a transfer of momentum and energy to bodies such as fixed scales
and synchronized clocks, which cannot be included in the description
of their functioning, if these bodies are to fulfil the role of defining
the reference frame. [9, p.5]
Bohr does I think have a consistent message, although there were pitfalls in
decoding it. He was never able to set it out deductively; he never succeeded
in defining the quantum postulate or his other attempted principles on a clear
phenomenological basis, on a par with the light postulate of special relativity
(the paradigm he clearly sought to emulate). But to my mind much the most
important of his failings is that he did not clearly acknowledge that at most
19Or as rigidly connected to bodies of arbitrarily large mass.
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complementarity was a conjecture; that there are new possibilities for the defi-
nition of “the phenomena” opened up by complementarity that it may or may
not be possible to integrate within a causal spacetime picture. There is nothing
in his arguments to show that that is impossible, or that the quantum postu-
late must always remain an inscrutable (“irrational”) foundation to the theory.
Bohr had only a theory that there could be no such theory.
6 COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE FORMAL-
ISM OF QUANTUM MECHANICS
I am in agreement with Scheibe, in his much-admired review of Bohr’s philoso-
phy, that “there is no single formulation of quantum mechanics based entirely
and consistently on the principles proposed by Bohr”, but I disagree when he
goes on to say:
[W]e have in fact no technically elaborated formulation of Bohr’s
quantum mechanics and that consequently it is not at present possi-
ble to make a really useful assessment of his contributions.”[33, p.5,
emphasis original]
Bohr did not so much as attempt to give a formulation of quantum mechanics,
of the sort that Scheibe was interested in; now was he interested in explaining
the formalism. He was interested in the qualitative phenomena.
Bohr did not write down the Schro¨dinger equation in any of the writings
we have considered; the canonical commutation relations only twice. The for-
malism, only once mentioned in his extensive review of 1949, was “an adequate
tool for a complementary way of description”, it “represents a purely symbolic
scheme permitting only predictions”. In 1958, that in the Schro¨dinger equation
“we are here dealing with a purely symbolic procedure, the unambiguous phys-
ical interpretation of which in the last resort requires a reference to a complete
experimental arrangement”. The formalism has a “non-pictorial character”.
The fact that the wave-function is defined on configuration space rather than
position space, and the essential role played by complex numbers in it, were cited
by Bohr (from the Como lecture on) as reasons to view it as purely abstract (a
point of view shared by de Broglie).
Present at the Warsaw conference of 1938 was John von Neumann. Like
Bohr, he gave an address on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, but
very different in spirit. He gave an axiomatization of quantum mechanics as
a projective geometry, over one of the reals, complex numbers or quaternions,
in terms of purely lattice-theoretic axioms. They were in turn interpreted as
the expression of new logical laws. Indeterminacy, in the quantum mechanical
sense, was related (so he argued) to the failure of distributivity. Von Neumann
promised further connections with the continuous geometries that had arisen in
his recent work on the classification of operator algebras.
For Bohr it was a stretch. But we learn something of his attitude to com-
plementarity from his reply, as reported thus:
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We must also notice that the question of the logical forms which
are best adapted to quantum theory is in fact a practical problem,
concerned with the choice of the most convenient manner in which
to express the new situation that arises in this domain. Personally,
he compelled himself to keep the logical forms of daily life to which
actual experiments were necessarily confined. The aim of the idea of
complementarity was to allow of keeping the usual logical forms while
procuring the extension necessary for including the new situation
relative to the problem of observation in atomic physics. [11, p.xxx]
Bohr was prepared to acknowledge the possibility of a revised logic, and alterna-
tives to complementarity. But as usual he was dogmatic about the impossibility
of a classically visualizable interpretation of quantum phenomena:
[I]t seems likely that the introduction of still further abstractions
into the formalism will be required to account for the novel features
revealed by the exploration of atomic processes of very high energy.
The decisive point, however, is that in this connection there is no
question of reverting to a mode of description which fulfils to a higher
degree the accustomed demands regarding pictorial representation
of the relationship between cause and effect. [11, p.xxx]
His case was unproven, however. The pilot-wave theory is a counterexample.
Why could there be no question of reverting to determinism? It is a disaster for
our understanding of Bohr and his doctrines that Bohr never made any public
statement on it.
On the measurement problem Bohr was almost as evasive. Bohr never chose
to address it as it arises at the formal level, in terms of the contrast between
the projection postulate and the unitary equations of motion. There is only one
comment he made in print that we can be sure was directed at the problem
in this sense. At the same Warsaw conference, Bialobizeski, the President of
the University and the chair of the conference, reviewed, somewhat imperfectly,
von Neumann’s formulation of the measurement problem along these formal
lines. He suggested that the duality between the unitary equations and the
projection postulate could not be assimilated to the choice of one or another of
two complementary descriptions, and that it must remain a fundamental posit
of the theory. Bialobizeski surely had a point. Here is the report of Bohr’s
response:
[T]he duality he noticed in the interpretation of the formalism of
quantum mechanics was, in his opinion, a question of choosing the
most adequate description of the experiment. If we decide to include
in the enumeration of the exterior conditions all the instruments
which must be used for the study of the whole phenomenon, the
only arbitrary factor remaining is, as he had explained in his paper,
the free choice of these experimental conditions, and, apart from this
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freedom, the interpretation of the solution of the problem, concern-
ing the predictions to which the phenomenon we are studying leads,
is perfectly unequivocal.[11, p.xxx]
The comment is too cryptic to be really illuminating. One can read a plausible
story into it: it is that the free choice of the experimental conditions determines,
as a choice of the parts of the apparatus in space and time (the positions of di-
aphragms, mirrors, springs and what have you), the relevant basis (the classical
variables defined with what latitudes), and that once this is fixed, the probabilis-
tic interpretation is unequivocal - just as effected by the projection postulate (as
a device to define probabilities from the wave-function). Wave-packet collapse,
real (as in a stochastic theory) or effective (as in pilot-wave theory or in the
Everett interpretation) can then be identified with the individual and holistic
element of the quantum postulate as well as with its uncontrollable element -
but this is all to put the matter in terms Bohr could hardly have recognized.
If Bialobizeski had pressed the suggestion that the unitary equations also ex-
plicitly incorporate the choice of experiment, the deeper objection that Bohr
was really committed to was that the unitary dynamics means nothing at all in
itself. That there is no causal, spacetime description thus provided that has to
be suspended, when a measurement is performed. The quantum formalism is
only an abstract calculus. As we have seen, Bohr made this point over and over
again.
7 COMPLEMENTARITY AS A CONJECTURE
Complementarity, as I read it, was a conjecture of unusually wide scope: that
where the experimental definition of certain concepts precluded the definition
of others, new regularities could be defined, that could not be captured by any
unified treatment involving all of them. Similarly, one might conjecture that
cosmology as an empirical discipline is impossible; or that science as a strictly
unified discipline is impossible. Closer to home is Rovelli’s recent conjecture
[30], that whilst any system can be modelled piecemeal in quantum mechanics,
no model can be given of the totality of physical systems; or conjectures by
Fuchs and others [24][36] on the possibilities of encoding information and the
transfer of information. Bohr has plenty of emulators today.
I see no a priori principle that rules out any of these strategies, but that is
only to say that they are at the end scientific conjectures, albeit at an unusually
high level of abstraction; they stand or fall by their durability and success. When
it comes to complementarity, surely, the jury is by now finally in.
In its negative claims complementarity denied the possibility of a causal
spacetime explanation for key experiments of quantum mechanics. In addition,
Bohr insisted that the formalism can only be interpreted by specification of a
(classically defined) context of measurement. But there are now plenty of exam-
ples of causal spacetime explanations for the phenomena that Bohr considered
(as given in all the major realist schools today, whether pilot-wave theory, GRW
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theory, or the Everett interpretation); and we have in decoherence theory tech-
niques for obtaining approximately classical descriptions from quantum ones
that evade Bohr’s strictures entirely.
On the positive side, Bohr did offer a framework for the analysis of quantum
phenomena in terms of classical concepts. Here we may grant him limited
success. The key point is that he offered an avenue - a new method in science -
whereby apparently inconsistent explanations could be reconciled. But it would
have been ad hoc to restrict it to quantum physics; if a new scientific method,
it should have applications in other fields as well. On two counts progress
was expected: progress with complementary theorizing in quantum physics -
reasoning along the lines he laid out in the Como lecture, in his reply to EPR,
and in his 1949 review - and progress with a similar style of theorizing in other
disciplines, whose elementary concepts also stand in such a relation of mutual
exclusion. Neither has been forthcoming.20
The historical record is clearly negative. But these failures could not have
been foreseen in the 1920s and ’30s. In retrospect, it is clear that Bohr’s philos-
ophy was essentially conservative, an extension of the methods that had served
him and his contemporaries well in the creation of quantum mechanics. If a
competing approach to the theory required their abandonment, without benefit
in terms of new experiments, little wonder that Bohr won the day: progress
by increment, by conservative extension of existing concepts and fragments of
theories, may not exactly be a principle of rationality, but pace Popper and
Kuhn, it is has served dynamics well through its long history [31].
I come back to the pilot-wave theory. At certain points I have said that it is
a counter-example to Bohr’s claims. How then could he have ignored it? Bohr’s
negligence in this respect may seem remarkable - so much so that it puts in
question our whole reading of his philosophy. But it is much worse on Heisen-
berg’s reading, that the “Copenhagen” interpretation, as he called it, was based
on the need to introduce “the observer” in physics;21 or on von Neumann’s,
that the measurement postulates only reflected the fact that any account of the
objective world must ultimately terminate in conscious perception. Claims of
20Bohr, in collaboration with Rosenfeld in 1933 did gave one other example of the genre (an
operational analysis of the limits to definability in free quantum electromagnetic field theory
[12]); and later, in 1950, an attempt at a comparable study of the interacting theory [13]. But
the panalophy of levers, trapdoors and springs so introduced seemed little sort of baroque.
Bohr was surely disappointed by the failure of complementarity in other fields. Whilst he
still held out the hope of applications of complementarity to biology and the social sciences
in 1958, he was markedly less optimistic in his final comments on the subject in 1962, a few
months before his death. There he acknowledged that the use of teleological explanations in
biology did not in fact imply any restriction on the application of physics to that field, adding,
in a departure from his text, that “in the last resort, it is a matter of how one makes headway
in biology. I think that the feeling of wonder which the physicists had thirty years ago has
taken a new turn. Life will always be a wonder, but what changes is the balance between the
feeling of wonder and the courage to try to understand” [10, p.26] (The implication, that with
complementarity one did not have the courage to understand, was surely unintended.)
21Heisenberg’s reading of orthodoxy made a happy target, in different ways, for Popper,
Feyerabend, and Hanson, who thereby helped to popularize it (I am indebted to Don Howard
for this and other observations on this history.)
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this scope are straightforwardly refuted by the pilot-wave theory.
Consider again the conservatism of Bohr’s assumptions. He insisted on no
philosophical principle, unless it was a broad and shallow operationalism. He
was dogmatic only in regard to the indispensability of classical concepts. He
offered cogent reasons to believe that the classical ideal of explanation, as a
causal spacetime description, may not be available in the quantum domain. In
its place he provided simple, context-relative accounts of paradigmatic quantum
phenomena in terms of classical concepts, many of them simple extensions of
the ideas of the old quantum theory. Against it pilot-wave theory made of
these quantities (apart from position), in any dynamical context, nothing but
epiphenomena, artifacts of the kinematical limit. Focus instead on the real
motions in configuration space, and all the usual interactions of electrodynamics
appear to be something close to nonsense.22 It made nonsense of some of the
new equations as well (for example, the uncertainty relations): considered as
“a principle which is necessary for the interpretation of the totality of quantum
phenomena”
These results, which the coherence and experimental verification of
the new mechanics have placed beyond any doubt, can in no way be
reconciled with the pilot-wave theory. The latter leads in particular
to a well-defined value of the linear momentum and does not allow
us to obtain the uncertainty relations. [18, p.177]
The remark was made by none other than de Broglie, a quarter of a century af-
ter the 5th Solvay conference; he allowed it to stand even after reading Bohm’s
papers of 1952. It shows how hard it was for him to accept that the dynam-
ical quantities revealed by experiment were not the real ones outside of the
measurement context, and vice versa.
Total energy, kinetic energy, momentum and spin as revealed by measure-
ment are not in general to be found in the particle trajectories [14]. The pilot-
wave theory is contextual with respect to all of them, in the technical sense, as
required by the Kochen-Specker-Bell theorem, but (with the possible exception
of spin) they are contextualized in Bohr’s sense too - which of such variables has
what meaning (what “latitude”) is a matter of the experimental context. And
what the pilot-wave theory does not deliver is a causal, spacetime account of
those very variables, across all contexts - just because they do not attach to the
particle trajectories. In this sense, it may even be said, the pilot-wave theory is
no counter-example to the principle of complementarity.
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